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The Determination of Top Executive Pay: the Importance of Human 
Capital Factors 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the relationship between director quality, 
measured in terms of human capital, and top executive pay. The sample 
is drawn from the largest UK quoted companies. Pay is split into basic 
salary and bonus payments. Finds age, tenure, years of board 
experience, years of experience as a director and the possession of an 
earned title all influence the level of top executive pay They exert a 
stronger influence on basic salary rather than on bonuses. 
Qualifications, both academic and professional, do not appear to 
influence executive pay.  
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The Determination of Top Executive Pay and the Importance of 
Human Capital Factors 
Executive pay has been the subject of much recent  discussion with 
concern being expressed about the levels of pay received by the chief 
executive officers of companies. One explanation for the apparently 
high levels of pay is that it reflects the accumulated experience and 
skills of the highest paid director (HPD). Characteristics such as age, 
experience and skills are measures of the HPD’s human capital. The 
basic premise is that the greater the investment an individual makes in 
human capital, the higher the expected return and therefore the higher 
the pay received. 
 
 The aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of various human 
capital measures on the level of pay received by the HPDs of large UK 
firms. The human capital variables discussed are age, the possession of 
qualifications, HPD experience, the number of additional directorships 
and the possession of a title. 
 
The next part of the paper discusses the background to the debate by 
analysing the empirical evidence on the effects of human capital 
characteristics on top executive pay. The next describes the data and 
the following section explains the variables. Then the results are 




There has been a great deal of public disquiet expressed about the 
recent rises in executive pay especially as they appear to bear little 
relation to company performance. For example, it has been shown that 
the pay awards granted to the top executives in the UK privatised 
utilities were related to company size rather than company performance 
[1]. The issue of top executive pay was one of a number of questions 
raised about the overall nature of the corporate governance of UK plcs. 
The response to these concerns was the setting up of the Cadbury 
Committee [2] and more recently the Greenbury [3] and Hampel [4] 
Committees. Although it is too early to assess their impact, Greenbury 
and Hampel developed some of the issues raised by Cadbury, 
particularly in relation to the determination of top executive pay. 
 
Cadbury proposed a voluntary Code of Best Practice for the governance 
of plcs. One area covered by the Code is the belief that top executive 
pay should be set by a remuneration committee and that the committee 
should consist of non-executive directors. A recent study, [5] found that 
by 1994, 90% of large UK firms based in the Midlands had introduced a 
remuneration committee. which indicates the widespread acceptance of 
elements of the Code of Best Practice amongst large plcs. 
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One of the key purposes of the remuneration committee is to link top 
executive pay to company performance and a number of studies have 
analysed the relationship. The general consensus of the studies is that 
company size and performance are both significant determinants of top 
executive pay. An excellent review of the evidence is found in [6]. 
However, the relationship between pay and size appears to be stronger 
and more meaningful than that between pay and performance. This 
applies to US [7] and UK [8] studies.  
 
Given the weak link that appears to exist between pay and 
performance,  attempts have been made to analyse the extent to which 
top executive pay reflects other characteristics such as experience, 
training and qualifications. The basis of this approach lies is human 
capital theory which maintains that qualifications and training represent 
investment which has been undertaken by individuals. The objective of 
the investment in human capital is to increase marginal productivity 
which will therefore result in higher pay [9].  
 
The issue of human capital was not directly addressed by Cadbury as 
far as the top executive director was concerned. Cadbury did recognise, 
however, that the reputation and standing of non-executive directors 
was critical if they were to be effective monitors of the executive 
directors. Therefore there was an acceptance by the committee that 
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human capital characteristics are important to the ability of directors to 
perform their required functions. Given this, we would expect higher 
quality directors (quality being measured by the director’s human 
capital) to be paid more than those with less human capital. It is 
therefore of interest to analyse how far remuneration committees reward 
directors’ investment in human capital.  
   
Human capital can be split into its two types, general and specific. 
General human capital refers to qualifications, skills or training which is 
transferable across jobs and industries. Examples include age, years of 
experience and the possession of a degree or a general professional 
qualification such as CIMA. In contrast, specific human capital refers to 
qualifications and experience which are linked to a particular sector or 
firm  and are thus less transferable. Examples of specific human capital 
include the number of years served on a board or tenure of office.  
 
The evidence relating to the impact of age on pay is mixed. Age is 
expected to be positively related to executive pay because it proxies the 
accumulation of experience and learning. The expected positive 
relationship has been found [10,11] whereas others have found no link 
[12,13]. One reason for the difference is that [10 and 11] are UK studies 
and [12 and 13] are US studies. This suggests a different attitude to age 
with UK firms rewarding experience and knowledge gained over a long 
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period more highly than firms in the US. It also implies that US firms are 
more willing to appoint younger executives to the top job. The example 
of UK building societies bears this out [14]. 
 
There is evidence that qualifications such as the possession of a degree 
or professional qualification is likely to lead to higher remuneration for 
top executives in the UK [15]. It has been argued that the widespread 
possession of higher qualifications has only become possible since the 
expansion of higher education in the 1960s. Prior to that, fewer people 
had the opportunity to do a degree which suggests that top executives 
over 50 years of age are less likely to possess such qualifications [16]. 
However, in a study of young, high-growth firms which employed 
younger top executives, it was found that only 57% had a degree or 
professional qualification [17].  
 
Tenure in a post represents job-specific experience and is expected to 
be positively related to executive pay given the knowledge and skills 
that have been accumulated. However, the evidence is conflicting with 
some studies finding that tenure is positively related to pay [18,19] 
whereas others find no relationship [20,21].  
 
Thus, although the issue is far from clear-cut, the weight of evidence 
indicates that human capital has a positive impact on pay. Most of the 
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studies use total top executive pay, however, we separate total pay into 
two parts - basic salary and bonus payments. This will enable us to 
assess the impact of human capital on the individual elements of the 
pay package. It may be expected that human capital will be a more 
important influence on basic salary than on bonuses because the basic 
salary represents a tangible return for previous experience and 
achievements. However, it is argued that the greater a top executive’s 
human capital, the better that company’s performance should be and 
hence the higher the bonuses received. Therefore investment in human 
capital will affect both elements of the remuneration package.    
 
Data   
Firms used in the analysis consist of a sample of UK public limited 
companies which covers all sectors of the economy. The sample was 
taken from the largest 200 ranked by market capitalisation in 1996. All 
the data refer to 1996. The largest public companies were selected 
because they tend to provide fuller biographies of their directors in their 
annual reports. They are also more frequently commented upon in the 
press in relation to the issue of top executive pay. However, difficulties 
in obtaining human capital data restricted the sample to 122 companies. 
Data problems included a lack of human capital data such as age and 
the number of years on the board. In addition, we were unable to obtain 
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some annual reports and some of the reports that were sent did not 
contain all the required information. 
 
The pay to be analysed is that of the highest paid director (HPD) who is 
usually the chief executive officer. However, the HPD can have a variety 
of titles including, for example,  the HPD of Marks and Spencer is Sir 
Richard Greenbury whose title is executive chairman: United Biscuits’ 
HPD is Eric Nicoli who is Group Chief Executive. Only HPDs who were 
either group chief executive or group chairman were included. Therefore 
divisional chief executives who had done exceptionally well, and had 
been paid more that the group chief executive, were excluded. For 
example, Dr Owen was the highest paid director at the Natwest Group 
in 1996  but was chief executive of Natwest Markets and not the whole 
group. 
 
The sample of companies was taken from the Extel Company Analysis, 
a database which provides comprehensive information on accounting 
and market measures. The identity of the highest paid director was 
obtained from 1996 company annual reports, which also provided 
details of the breakdown of executive pay. Two sources were used for 
the director human capital data, company annual reports and the Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register. The Corporate Register provides 
details of board structure, board membership, shareholdings and 
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1. Three measures of pay were used: 
(i) salary - the basic salary plus the monetary value of taxable benefits.  
(ii) bonus - the cash bonus payment received. 
(iii) total cash pay - salary plus bonus. It therefore excludes pension 
payments, compensation for loss of office and the value of share option 
schemes. 
2. Age - the age of the HPD. 
3. Qualifications  - all are binary variables which have a value of one if 
the HPD possessed the qualification and zero if not. There are three 
qualification variables: 
(i) any higher qualification - includes a  first degree or post graduate 
level qualification such as an MSc or MPhil. 
(ii) professional qualifications -  includes membership of an accountancy 
body, sector-specific qualifications or other general professional 
qualifications such as CIM and IPM. 
(iii) any qualification - includes any post-school qualification, whether it 
be a degree or professional qualification. 
4. Director experience is represented by three measures: 
(i) the number of years served in the present position 
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(ii) the number of years served on the present board 
(iii) the number of years served as a main board director of a quoted 
public limited company 
5. Additional directorships - is the number of additional directorships 
held on the boards of UK plcs. 
6. Title - is a binary variable and has a value of one if the HPD has an 
earned title such as a knighthood or OBE and zero if no title has been 
awarded. This would include examples such as Sir Stanley Kalms at 
Dixons and Dr George Mathewson CBE at the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
 
It is hypothesised that investment in human capital, as measured by the 
above variables should result in greater rewards and should be reflected 
in the pay of the top executives.  
 
Results 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used. The average basic 
salary is £393,000. The range is £142,000 to £1,370,000. Thus even 
within large plcs, there are substantial differences in basic payments. In 
terms of bonus payments, there are also large differences with some 




The average age of HPDs is 56 which is similar to another study [22] 
which included data covering the 1930s and 1970s. Thus, although the 
youngest HPD was 38, it appears that there is an inbuilt bias against 
promoting young executives. This suggests that, in large UK 
companies, that age is regarded as in key indicator of experience which 
in turn illustrates the importance of age as a measure of human capital.   
 
Just over half, 55%, of the HPDs had an academic qualification at 
degree level or beyond, 44% had a professional qualification and 77% 
had some form of qualification. This is higher than [23] who found that 
57% of younger top executives, whose average age was 37, had either 
an academic or professional qualification. this suggests that increasing 
access to higher education has not increased the proportion of top 
executives gaining post-school qualifications. However, it may be that 
the younger top executives come from different social and academic 
backgrounds than the older top executives. 
 
The average length of the tenure of the HPD in their present position is 
7.7 years and the average number of years served on present board is 
11.5 years. This indicates that they spent an average of almost 4 years 
on the company’s main board before becoming the HPD. The average 
number of years served as a director of a public limited company is 13.2 
which is slightly higher than the number of years served on the board. 
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This suggests that HPDs tend to join the board as outsiders with 
previous board experience and therefore previous experience is 
regarded as a valuable contribution to an individual’s human capital.   
 
The average number of additional directorships is unexpectedly low, 
only 1.1. This suggests that, because most HPDs are also chief 
executives, they will have less time to undertake outside commitments, 
even if they are part-time. It may be that additional directorships are a 
better measure of the reputation of someone who was a top executive 
but has since retired from that post. Thus the return to this form of 
human capital may not become apparent until the end of a career as a 
full time top executive.  
 
Less than a third, 30%, of HPDs have been awarded an honour such as 
a CBE or an OBE. Nevertheless, it is quite a high proportion of a 
relatively small group of people and therefore is an important indicator 
of accumulated human capital. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 shows the relationship between pay and the age distribution of 
the HPDs in the sample. The majority  of HPDs, 61%,  are aged 
between 50 and 60 with 19% being 50 or under. Surprisingly perhaps 
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there is still 6 % of the sample who are older than the retirement age of 
65. 
 
In terms of total pay, the lowest is earned by HPDs under 45 and the 
highest by those over 65. However, the link is not so clear for the ages 
45-65. For example, the second lowest average is paid to the second 
oldest group, 61-65 and the second highest is paid to the fourth oldest 
group, 56-60.  
 
With the exception of the 61-65 age group, there is a positive 
relationship between age and basic. The highest basic salaries are paid 
to those HPDs over 66 and the lowest to those under 46. Little pattern 
emerges in relation to bonus payments. The highest bonus is paid to the 
HPDs in the youngest age group, under 45 and the smallest to the 
oldest HPDs. Over the intervening years, the value of the bonus 
remains similar across the other age groups. Further, the relative 
importance of the two elements remains fairly constant at around 73% 
for basic salary and 27% for bonus. In addition, the increase in salary 
and bonus is relatively small as age increases, only 13% and 16% 
respectively, between the ages of 50 and 60. Thus for a large part of 
their working life, the contribution of age to human capital receives 
relatively little reward. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
The expected relationship between qualifications and pay is that HPDs 
who possess qualifications will be paid more than those without them. 
As Table 3 shows, the three categories which receive the highest total 
pay and highest basic salaries include HPDs who have no 
qualifications. The highest total pay figure is received by those with no 
professional qualification and the second highest by those who have no 
qualifications at all. Those with an academic qualification received the 
fourth highest total pay. Thus the argument that gaining a qualification is 
a means to increasing human capital, and hence to increase income, is 
not borne out by the figures for either total or basic pay. 
 
If the possession of a qualification represents an important element of 
human capital, we would expect that the bonus component would be 
relatively higher than for HPDs who did not possess qualifications 
because the company’s performance should be better. Although the 
proportion of total pay received as bonus is slightly higher for those with 
qualifications, the difference is not significant. There is therefore no 
evidence to support the view that that the possession of academic or 
professional qualifications is a type of human capital which leads to 
higher pay. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
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Three measures of director experience were used to test the link 
between experience and pay: tenure in position, the number of years 
served on the board and the number of years as a director. It is 
expected that executive pay will be positively related to director 
experience. The results are shown in Table 4. Over the first ten years as 
a whole, tenure makes little difference to pay, whether it be basic, bonus 
or total. However, during the first five years, pay is slightly higher which 
may indicate that an initial premium was paid to attract externally 
recruited HPDs. Larger rewards are paid for those with eleven to fifteen 
years experience and, although those with more than fifteen years 
experience find their total pay has fallen, the basic salary is now far 
more important. Thus tenure does not appear to be linked to higher pay. 
 
There is a positive relationship between basic salary and the number of 
years on the board. However, the differences in pay are not large. For 
example, basic salary only increases by 5% between the first 0-5 and 
10-15 year categories. In contrast, we found that bonus payments and 
the number of years on the board do not appear to be linked except for 
the slight decline in bonuses after ten years service on the board. There 
is a positive relationship between basic salary and years as a director.  




In general, salary and bonuses do not have a simple relationship with 
experience. Salary tends to increase with board experience and so it 
appears to be a useful measure of human capital. However, bonuses 
and the measures of experience do not appear to be linked which 
indicates that years experience do not get translated into bonus 
payments but rather become embedded in the basic salary.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
It is expected that additional directorships and titles will be positively 
related to executive pay. Table 5 shows that HPDs who have more than 
one additional directorship earn a higher basic than those with no 
additional directorships. The difference is, however, only 6%. However, 
the total pay for those with additional directorships is slightly less 
because of the differences in bonuses. Those with no additional 
directorships earned bonuses which were 31% higher than HPDs who 
had more than one further directorship. This suggests that those HPDs 
who were only on the board of one company were more effective than 
those who spread their talents around. Thus this form of peer 
recognition does not translate into significant additional payments. 
 
Table 5 also shows that those who have received a title earn higher 
total, basic and bonus payments. The differences are quite large,  29% 
on the total, over 34% on the basic and 16% on the bonus. Thus a title 
awarded in recognition of achievements, whether it be for services to 
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business, charity or public service, represents a measure of human 
capital which yields substantial returns. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess the influence of director quality on 
the remuneration of the highest paid director. Director quality was 
measured by means of the human capital accumulated by the HPDs of 
large UK public corporations. A number of human capital variables were 
used including age, qualifications, experience, number of additional 
directorships and possession of a title. 
 
It was expected that directors who were older, better qualified and 
generally more experienced would receive more pay because of the 
consequent increased productivity. The results suggest that age, tenure, 
years of board experience, years of experience as a director and the 
possession of a title are regarded as good indicators of director quality 
because they are associated with higher basic pay. The possession of 
academic or professional qualifications however do not have a positive 
effect on basic pay. The generally positive, but weak, relationship 
between human capital characteristics and top executive pay may be 
due to the imperfect market for executives in the UK [24], political power 
in the boardroom [25] or may simply be that on the job experience and 
training is more important than formal qualifications [26]. 
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Human capital variables seem to influence the basic salary more than 
the bonus suggesting that basic salary is more of a function of director 
quality than is short term bonus payments. This lends support to the 
argument that pay is influenced by different factors [26]. The results 
have shown that disaggregating total pay into its basic and bonus 
components has highlighted a number of characteristics which influence 
the individual parts of the pay measure.  
 
Thus, given the continuing concerns relating to governance issues, 
concentrating on the pay-performance relationship appears to be 
ignoring other factors which are important is the pay setting process. It 
would therefore be useful if remuneration committees indicated the 
extent to which human capital characteristics were included in the 
determination of top executive pay. For example, remuneration 
committee reports usually indicate that factors such as director 
experience are part of the pay package but no indication is given about 
its relative weighting. Such information would improve communications 
between the interested parties and prevent some of the 
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TABLE 1 Summary statistics 
 
Variable Average Minimum Maximum 
salary £393,000 £142,000 £1,370,000
bonus £140,000 £ 0 £1,212,000
age 56 38 74 
academic qualification * 55 % n/a n/a 
professional qualification * 44% n/a n/a 
any qualification 77 n/a n/a 
tenure 7.7 years 1 year 40 years 
years on board 11.5 years 1 year 47 years 
years as a director 13.2 years 2 years 47 years 
number of additional 
directorships 
1.1 0 5 
possession of a title * 30 % n/a n/a 
n = 122 
* refers to a binary variable 
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Salary Bonus Total Pay Salary as % of  
Total Pay 
Bonus as % of 
Total Pay 
 
less than 45 4 278 173 451 62  38  
46-50 15 360 133 493 73  27  
51-55 28 398 141 531 74  26  
56-60 33 408 155 563 72  28  
61-65 15 343 146 489 70  30  
66 plus 6 579 28 607 95  5 
n = 122       
 2
TABLE 3 Average 1996 Pay (£ 000) by Qualifications 
 
 Salary Bonus Total Pay Salary 
as % of 
Total Pay 
Bonus 
as % of 
Total Pay 
Academic Qualification 381 151 532 72  28  
Professional Qualification 362 126 488 74  26  
Any Qualification 375 144 519 72 28  
No Academic 
Qualification 
409 124 533 77  23  
No Professional 
Qualification 
418 151 669 73  27  
No Qualification 
n = 122 
454 127 581 78  22  
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TABLE 4 Director Experience and Average Pay (£000) 
 
Experience  





Years on Board Years as Director 
 Salary   Bonus Total Salary  Bonus  Total Salary   Bonus Total 
0-5 386           151 537 380          140    520   337           142    479 
6-10 357           134 491 372          146    518 378           154    532 
11-15 456           170 626 400          124    524 384           115    499 
>15 501            62 563 437          138    575 465           139    604 
n = 122     
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Basic Bonus Total 
has one or more additional 
directorships 
 
402 128 530 
no additional directorships 
 
377 168 545 
has a title 
 
478 155 633 
has no title 
 
n = 122 
356 133 489 
  
